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Abstract  
 
In this paper a theory of group facilitation and communication is introduced, based on the 
work of Gregory Bateson and the Palo Alto schools he founded and inspired. This theory 
permits an analysis of group facilitation processes on the basis of the same principles that in-
form system dynamic model building and simulation. Through this theory existing lists of ap-
propriate facilitation skills and attitudes are elaborated and augmented. This leads to greater 
insight into the quality of the process of group model building and possible ways to evaluate 
that process. Ultimately, the growth and proliferation of system dynamic models and simula-
tions depends on improvement of both process and content of modeling and simulation. 
 
Introduction 
 
In the past two decades system dynamics models and simulations increasingly have found 
their way from the minds and computers of system analysts to the minds and meetings of 
managers (Lars and Lomi 1999). Important in this transition has been the involvement of 
management in the model-building process, i.e., in group model building (e.g., Vennix 1996; 
Andersen and Richardson 1997). It has been acknowledged that, if management is to be en-
abled to tackle “messy problems” (Vennix 1999) and to be involved in learning that is deep 
(Bianchi 2002), double-loop (Isaacs and Senge 1992; Sterman 1994) and generative (Senge 
1990), the process of group model building is at least as important as the content of the mod-
els and simulations involved. 
The importance of process vis-à-vis content, however, is not generally reflected in the 
evaluations of system dynamics simulations and interventions. Many evaluations have con-
centrated on model / simulator characteristics, subject characteristics and situational charac-
teristics, assessing their impact on performance indicators (e.g., Grössler 2004; Keating et al. 
1999; Rouwette et al. 2004). A few evaluations have concentrated on both process and con-
tent. Here it was found that consensus and commitment to a group decision were positively 
influenced by the process and quality of the communication within the group, which in its 
turn was positively related to the skills of the group facilitator (e.g., Akkermans 2001; Ak-
kermans and Vennix 1997; Rouwette 2003).  
In spite of the paucity of evaluations, various authors have emphasized the crucial impor-
tance of group facilitation in the process of group model building. The group facilitator acts as 
a role model for the group, helping the group to solve its problems with the appropriate facili-
tating behaviors, attitudes and skills (Isaacs and Senge 1992; Vennix 1996, 1999). Vennix in 
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particular has outlined a list of attitudes and skills considered important for effective group 
facilitation (Vennix 1996, pp.146ff). In this paper I will develop this line of arguments further 
by outlining a theory of group facilitation and communication on the basis of system dynam-
ics principles. The rationale is that the credibility and effectiveness of system dynamics inter-
ventions will improve in the eyes of client groups and organizations, if principles and methods 
of group facilitation are fully congruent with principles and methods of model building and 
simulation. 
The theory of group facilitation and communication in this paper is based on the work of the 
British anthropologist Gregory Bateson and the so-called Palo Alto schools in communication 
and psychotherapy he founded and inspired (other influential members included Jay Haley, 
Paul Watzlawick and Don Jackson). Although generally neglected by system dynamics schol-
ars, Bateson and the Palo Alto scholars were the first to apply principles of system dynamics 
to communication processes.
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In this paper I will first outline the system dynamic principles of communication on the ba-
sis of the Palo Alto work. Second, with this theory I will specify various problems of commu-
nication and possible ways to react to these. Finally, some conclusions are drawn.  
Throughout the paper I will use a concrete example to illustrate principles and problems. It 
is adapted from a workshop memo, reported in Akkermans and Vennix (1997, p.8): 
 
At the end of a learning-wheel workshop the group facilitator poses a question to the par-
ticipants about the organizational platform for the model they have been developing. 
One of the participants, a bank manager, replies: “Your original advice was mainly eco-
nomical; it did not contain these kinds of considerations.” 
The facilitator looks surprised at the manager, bends over to look at the thick portfolio 
with research data in front of him and lifts it partially as if to say “And what about this 
here, then?” 
 
Principles of dynamics communication systems 
 
In their analysis of communication processes, the Palo Alto scientists primarily focused on 
relationships, not on individuals. In this respect they differed from mainstream social and 
cognitive psychology, to which they ascribed a “traditionally… strong trend toward a mo-
nadic view of man and, consequently,… strong trend toward a reification of what now reveal 
themselves more and more as complex patterns of relationships and interaction” (Watzlawick 
et al. 1967, p. 22). Because of its exclusive focus on human interaction, the Palo Alto perspec-
tive has expanded existing psychological approaches in five ways: 
(1) The Palo Alto scientists expressed the determining role of interaction in the axiom of the 
‘impossibility of not communicating’. All behavior (verbal and non-verbal) occurring be-
tween persons who are conscious of each other’s presence has behavioral effects, whether in-
tended or not. Such effects have interpersonal message value, and thus are communicative in 
nature. Since it is impossible for humans not to behave in one way or another, it follows that 
in interaction it is impossible not to communicate (Bateson 1963; Watzlawick et al. 1967). In 
the example, all the bodily movements, words and facial expressions the bank manager and 
facilitator display have an effect on the other. 
(2) The Palo Alto scientists offered a refined analysis of verbal behavior by distinguishing 
between different levels and modes of communication. The levels refer to the content (or re-
port) and relationship (or command) aspects of communication. Any piece of communication 
not only conveys information, but also (and at the same time) imposes behavior. The com-
mand aspect serves as a communication about the report, referring to the nature of the rela-
tionship between the communicating persons as the ‘definition of the relation’. The command 
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aspect thus classifies the content aspect and is therefore a metacommunication. The modes of 
communication are distinguished in verbal and nonverbal. Levels and modes tend to be corre-
lated, because verbal communication often coincides with object information (content level), 
while nonverbal communication tells the outside observer much about the definition(s) of the 
relationship (Haley 1963; Watzlawick et al. 1967). In the example, the facilitator’s lifting of 
the portfolio conveys a powerful nonverbal message of disagreement to the bank manager.  
(3) The Palo Alto scientists analyzed human interaction at a higher level than that of single 
behavior events. They regard interaction as a continuous exchange of messages, on which a 
certain degree of punctuation may be imposed. This punctuation serves to organize the behav-
iors of the communicating persons in patterns. These patterns are defined by the participants 
as certain characteristics of their relationship (e.g., dominance, dependency, withdrawal), de-
pending upon their interpretation of events (Bateson 1972; Bateson and Jackson 1968; 
Watzlawick et al. 1967). In the example, the bank manager could view his interaction with the 
facilitator as vigilant and watchful, whereas the facilitator could view this interaction as in-
quisitive and distrustful.  
(4) The Palo Alto scientists distinguished between symmetrical and complementary interac-
tion. Such interaction depends upon whether the communicants exchange identical or differ-
ent types of behavior in attempts to respectively minimize or maximize inequality between 
them. Symmetrical interaction often takes a competitive, ‘me-too’ form, in which both par-
ticipants try to outperform one another in some area of achievement and thus attempt to con-
trol the definition of their relationship. Complementary interaction, on the other hand, refers 
to a situation in which one participant occupies a primary position, while the other plays a 
secondary role. The relationship is interlocking or mutually fitting, to the extent that one 
communicant does not impose complementarity on the other, but that both persons behave in 
ways that fit their definitions of the relationship (Bateson 1958; Haley 1963; Watzlawick et 
al. 1967). Normally client-consultant relations are of a complementary nature. However, in 
the example a few more rounds of similar verbal-nonverbal exchanges between the facilitator 
and the bank manager could lead to an increasingly symmetrical interaction, in which both 
communicants are in fact saying “You should accept my definition of our relationship!” 
(5) The Palo Alto scientists emphasized that continuous interaction systems (like family re-
lations, friendships, and daily work relations) are characterized by relationship rules, or stabi-
lized definitions of the relation. These rules may regard aspects like symmetry, complemen-
tarity, punctuation and others, and necessarily appear in any relationship of some endurance 
(Haley 1963; Watzlawick et al. 1967). In the example, when the facilitator and the bank man-
ager would have to work together for a longer period of time and the nature of their commu-
nication would not change, then their interaction could become governed by rules like ‘we 
only agree to disagree’ or ‘we watch each other very closely.’ 
On the basis of these five points the Palo Alto scientists regarded communication as a sys-
tem, in which “two or more communicants [are] in the process of, or at the level of, defining 
the nature of their relationship” (Watzlawick et al. 1967, p.121). Such systems are fundamen-
tally open in nature, showing properties like feedback (in which a chain of events leads back 
to itself, providing circularity of cause and effect), equifinality (in which results or end-states 
are not determined by initial conditions, but by variable processes within the system’s pa-
rameters), and Gestalt (following which the whole is more or different than the mere sum of 
the parts constituting the whole).  
 
Problems of dynamic communication systems 
 
Problems in communication arise from miscommunication. Consider two speakers A and B, 
of whom one A emits message a, to which the other B responds with message b. In this case 
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message a provides the context for message b, whereby the context is determined by the na-
ture of the relationship between A and B. Miscommunication occurs when response b is in-
congruent with the context in which message a has been emitted. Response b can be said to 
have two levels of meaning, one outside the context of the communication sequence (i.e., by 
its pure content) and one inside that context (i.e., in the relationship between A and B). Since 
both levels may be considered correct without changing the verbal content of message b, re-
ceiver A is left uncertain and confused about the ‘real’ nature of message b (Sluzki et al 
1977). On the basis of clinical evidence, the Palo Alto scientists distinguished three forms of 
miscommunication (Sluzki et al 1977; Watzlawick 1971, 1976):  
(1) Tangentialization. Here response b follows message a in such a way that it disregards 
both the content of a and the intent of A, but acknowledges A’s intention to communicate. In 
the example, this would occur when the bank manager would react as follows: 
 
[…] The facilitator looks surprised at the manager, bends over to look at the thick portfo-
lio with research data in front of him and lifts it partially as if to say “And what about this 
here, then?” 
The bank manager, looking out of the window: “You could make a nice fire with that pile 
of paper.” 
 
(2) Disqualification. Here four sub forms may be distinguished: 
(2a) Evasion. Here response b follows message a in such a way that b switches to a new 
subject of discussion without marking this switch and without a having clearly ended the pre-
vious subject of discussion. In the example, this would occur when the bank manager would 
react as follows: 
 
[…] The facilitator looks surprised at the manager, bends over to look at the thick portfo-
lio with research data in front of him and lifts it partially as if to say “And what about this 
here, then?” 
The bank manager, absent mindedly checking his watch: “Isn’t it time for lunch yet?” 
 
(2b) Sleight-of-hand. Here response b follows message a in such a way that b switches to a 
new subject of discussion by marking this switch as an answer, without a having clearly 
ended the previous subject of discussion. In the example, this would occur when the bank 
manager would react as follows: 
 
[…] The facilitator looks surprised at the manager, bends over to look at the thick portfo-
lio with research data in front of him and lifts it partially as if to say “And what about this 
here, then?” 
The bank manager: “Yes, you have been working hard on these data.” 
 
(2c) Status disqualification. Here response b follows message a in such a way that b 
changes the subject of discussion from the content of a to the person of A, which switch is 
marked by an implicit derogatory reference to A’s status. In the example, this would occur 
when the bank manager would react as follows: 
 
[…] The facilitator looks surprised at the manager, bends over to look at the thick portfo-
lio with research data in front of him and lifts it partially as if to say “And what about this 
here, then?” 
The bank manager, smiling politely: “I just wondered how much experience you have with 
workshops like these.” 
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(2d) Redundant question. Here response b follows message a in such a way that b partly or 
fully rephrases a as a question, implicitly implying doubt or disagreement with a. In the ex-
ample, this would occur when the bank manager would react as follows: 
 
[…] The facilitator looks surprised at the manager, bends over to look at the thick portfo-
lio with research data in front of him and lifts it partially as if to say “And what about this 
here, then?” 
The bank manager, smiling friendly: “What do these data tell us, then?” 
 
(3) Mystification. Here response b follows message a in such a way that b implies that A 
should abandon his/her own interpretation of the context of their relationship in favor of B’s 
interpretation of that context.
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 In the example, this would occur when the bank manager 
would react as follows: 
 
[…] The facilitator looks surprised at the manager, bends over to look at the thick portfo-
lio with research data in front of him and lifts it partially as if to say “And what about this 
here, then?” 
The bank manager retorts angrily: “Let me explain to you what these data mean!!” 
 
The reaction of A to B’s tangential, disqualifying or mystifying response to A’s initial mes-
sage determines whether their miscommunication is being resolved, continued or even wors-
ened. A’s reaction may take four different forms (Sluzki et al 1977): 
(1) A explicitly comments on the incongruence in B’s response. This metacommunication 
requires that A becomes aware of B’s double message, which awareness often starts with 
physical symptoms (headache, stomach pain) and feelings of psychic tension and uneasiness. 
It further requires that A adequately communicates these feelings to B, in such a way that B 
may become aware of the incongruent nature of his/her message. Under these requirements, 
metacommunication may resolve the miscommunication and lead to increasing communica-
tional clarity. In the example, the facilitator would first have to explicate the meaning of his 
nonverbal lifting behavior and then communicate his feelings about the manager’s response to 
the manager.  
(2) A evades B’s incongruent response by withdrawing from the situation, by remaining si-
lent, or by returning to an earlier point in the communication sequence with B. In this way A 
avoids both metacommunication and acceptance of B’s double message. In the example, the 
facilitator would return to the bank manager’s first reply and start a new communication se-
quence from there. 
(3) A accepts B’s incongruent response by reacting to one level of meaning and neglecting 
the other level, without marking this redefinition of the situation. In this way the miscommu-
nication between A and B is continued until one of them would resort to metacommunication 
or evasion. In the example, the facilitator would respond only to the verbal content of the 
bank manager’s reply and disregard his nonverbal signs (tone of voice, facial expression, 
looking away, etc.). 
(4) A counters B’s incongruent message with another incongruent message, for example 
with self-disqualification or a disqualification of B. In this way the miscommunication be-
tween A and B swiftly deteriorates, leading to increasingly confusing and bizarre forms of in-
teraction. In the example, the facilitator would respond to the bank manager in an equally tan-
gential, disqualifying or mystifying way, making their mutual communication increasingly in-
effective and incomprehensible for the other workshop participants. 
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Discussion and conclusions 
 
In this paper a theory of group facilitation and communication has been introduced, based 
on the work of Bateson and the Palo Alto schools. This theory permits an analysis of group 
facilitation processes on the basis of the same principles that inform system dynamic model 
building and simulation. The principles and problems, thus developed, elaborate and augment 
Vennix’ (1996, pp.146ff) list of appropriate facilitation attitudes and skills in three aspects:  
(1) The ‘impossibility of not communicating’ makes all verbal and nonverbal behaviors, 
emitted in the presence of others, significant. Nonverbal signs are as (probably even more) 
important for the determination of the relationship with the other as the verbal words that are 
spoken. This implies that, strictly speaking, neutrality in group facilitation is not possible. The 
facilitator’s opinion will always ‘leak through’ in subtle nonverbal signs (a small hand ges-
ture, the wink of an eye) that will be consciously or unconsciously recorded by the partici-
pants. It is preferable that the facilitator communicates candidly about his/her own prefer-
ences, in such a way that participants will feel free to question and discuss these preferences.  
(2) Miscommunication primarily arises from communication that is incongruent in the rela-
tional context of the communicating persons. It is the task of the group facilitator to detect and 
correct such incongruent communication, both in his/her own communication and in that of 
participants. This requires self-awareness and self-knowledge on the part of the facilitator, 
enabling him/her to experience swiftly the physical and psychic tensions that incongruent 
communication tends to cause. Incongruent communication is most effectively solved by 
metacommunication, which requires that the facilitator is capable of expressing his/her emo-
tional feelings in a non-threatening way, inviting the incongruently communicating person to 
recognize the incongruence and reflect on it. 
(3) The integrity and authenticity of the group facilitator is highly dependent upon the con-
gruence in his/her verbal and verbal-nonverbal communication. Incongruently communicating 
facilitators may not ‘walk their talk’ or may, through subtle nonverbal signs, display disinter-
est in the group model process or contempt for (one or more of) the group participants, in 
spite of their verbal assurances on the contrary. Participants quickly sense the lack of veracity 
of the facilitator’s attempts to direct the meetings and react accordingly. They will come to 
distrust the intentions of the facilitator. They are likely to comply only superficially with 
his/her directions and mentally dissociate themselves from the group model process. 
On a closing note: for system dynamic models and simulations to grow and proliferate, the 
development of accurate complex and dynamic models is important. However, equally impor-
tant may be the further development of system dynamic group facilitation skills and attitudes, 
since the quality of personal interaction may be as decisive for the success of simulations as 
the quality of the models. Future evaluations of system dynamic interventions and group 
model building should reflect this dual emphasis on process and content. 
 
Notes 
 
* The author likes to thank Etiënne Rouwette and three anonymous conference reviewers 
for their constructive comments on an earlier draft of this paper. 
1
 To be fair, Richardson (1991, p.86) has recognized Bateson as a “transitional figure who 
wholeheartedly embraced the new cybernetic notions in the social sciences”, and he has dis-
cussed Bateson’s concept of schismogenesis as an important forerunner of the feedback con-
cept. Yet Bateson may be credited for much more. He was largely responsible for bringing 
cybernetic theory to the realm of interpersonal relations. By his concept of double bind he 
made ‘self-contradictory message loops’ an important part of dyadic and group system dy-
namics (see further Visser 2003ab, 2006).  
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2
 Normally, humans rely on their own senses to develop their interpretations of reality. 
However, humans in situations of high dependence or severe social pressure of other persons 
may be faced with an untenable situation, in which they are forced to choose between their 
own perceptions and interpretations and their relations to those other persons. The effects of 
these forced choice situations have been assessed in the experiments on ‘obedience to author-
ity’ (Milgram 1974) and ‘line judgments’ (Asch 1952, 1955; see further Watzlawick 1976). 
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